INS Karanj collision with fishing boat off Goa claims two fishermen’s lives, sparking debate on submarine crew’s actions | X
Mumbai: It is odd that the Indian Navy should blame a fishing boat M V Marthoma for ramming INS Karanj (S 23), a Scorpene class submarine, worth at least Rs 8000 crore, 70 nautical miles off the coast of Goa around 7.15 pm on the night of November 21.
A criminal case has been filed against the Tandel (helmsman) as well. Many aspects of the Navy story are bereft of sea legs. It is plainly inferable that the collision was result of bad decision making aboard the submarine.
According to an FIR registered at the Yellow Gate Police station, Mumbai, the crew of INS Karanj, operating at periscope depth, at a speed of 6 knots an hour, spotted a dimly lit stationary fishing vessel 2-3 kilometres away on the starboard side, which means to the right side of the bow of the submarine. The vessel was stationary.
The FIR says that it was not transmitting via the Automatic Identification System which provides the name of the vessel, its registration number, the place of registration. The FIR mentions that the fishing boat was not seen clearly. The fact remains it had been spotted. That is all that matters.
Under any circumstance it is incumbent upon the submarine to avoid a collision. That is the first rule. Fishing boats are a constant menace to submarines operating along coastlines and collisions occur far more frequently than is reported, which made it imperative upon the crew of the submarine to stay vigilant.
Also, Rule 15 of the Maritime Rules of the Road, which are the rules of navigation, covers the situation when two power driven vessels have to cross each other. It says to avoid collision, the give way vessel — in this case the 2000 tone submarine which had the fishing boat on the starboard side has – compulsorily had to take early and substantial action to keep out of harm’s way. There are no two ways to interpret this.
The options before a highly manoeuvrable, modern vessel like INS Karanj, recently commissioned, are many. The submarine can submerge, allowing the fishing vessel to pass overhead. Even if the fishing vessel cleared the submarine by a mere whisker or a foot, it would have been enough.
In this case the continental shelf off Goa is gradual and at 70 nautical miles from the shore, there would have been enough seawater for this manoeuvre. Or the submarine could have surfaced, and alerted the fishing vessel of its presence. Or the submarine could have stopped, allowing the fishing vessel to pass. Or it could have reversed to avoid a collision.
In modern submarines it is a seamless operation and in the older ones it takes a little more time because the propellers have to be stopped and then made to rotate the opposite way. Or the fifth way would have been to take a sharp ninety degree turn starboard to avoid the collision.
With the fishing vessel about three kilometres away, there were as many as fifteen minutes before a potential collision given the submarine’s speed and course, enough window to have exercised any of these options. There exists one more scenario that can be considered: that the submarine was snorting which is to say it was recharging its batteries with its valves open, replenishing oxygen, charging its batteries with its engines on.
To be at periscope depth means about two and a half metres of the periscope is sticking out of the water through which the crew is able to keep watch on the surface. In this eventuality of snorting or snorkelling, the engines would have had to be switched off first before any of the outlined steps could have been taken. A lot depends on how fast the crew is able to get its act together but in the last contingency, it is a matter of five additional minutes. Not more.
It is presumable that the Navy had not posted an officer on watch so he could learn on the job that night. In the Scorpene class submarine it is very possible that a couple of other crew members would have been in the control room at that time of the night. The officer on watch has the authority to take the necessary steps to avoid the collision or inform the vessel commander of the situation and seek instructions.
On November 21, the sun had set at 6 pm. Moonrise was 11.22 PM, another four hours away, and it was a quarter moon night, which means there would have been about half the amount of moonlight lighting the sea as compared to a full moon night.
Submarines are designed to remain invisible to surface vessels, and on a quarter moon night, there was no way the fishing vessel could have spotted the submarine from a distance of 2-3 kilometres even if the sea were calm. It is pretty hard to spot a submarine periscope sticking out 2 or three meters out of the sea from that distance even on a bright sunny day, given the wake left behind by the periscope is negligible.
According to the FIR, it was then that the Karanj’s sonar caught the unidentified vessel coming towards the submarine and the Officer on Watch increased the speed and changed the direction to avoid collision. It did not help. The vessel banged into INS Karanj, capsized and sank.
The submarine was able to save five fishermen, and six others swam to the safety of another fishing boat, while two drowned, including, possibly, the Tandel. The damange to the submarine is being placed at Rs 10 crores. The damage to the Navy’s reputation: considerably more, surely.
Instances like this reflect badly on the decision making processes that lead to such outcomes. It is more than just a possibility that bad decisions were made on the night of November 21, 2024. There is no other way to look at it.
