The Maharashtra elections are done and dusted. Slowly the visible signs of the elections will fade away – the election posters on the walls all over the State will soon be replaced by other messages. Conversations will go back to community issues, farming problems, and discussions on much more relevant things than the elections. But that’s the disappearance of the visible signs. However, the scars of the major loss in Maharashtra are not going to fade away that easily from the minds of Congress workers. The one question that is going to nag them is where did we go wrong.
In a simplistic sense, it’s easy to conclude that by voting back in the Mahayuti (the coalition of BJP, Shiv Sena (Shinde) , and NCP(Ajit Pawar) to power, the Maharashtra electorate has prioritized growth and development over the politics of polarization and divisiveness. The Mahayuti swept the polls with clear a majority – winning 230 seats out of 288. In contrast, the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) (the coalition of Congress, Shiv Sena (UBT), and NCP(Sharad Pawar), barely managed to cross the 50-seat mark. The Mahayuti’s decisive victory, driven by welfare schemes, a growth-led agenda and a cohesive campaign, has exposed glaring weaknesses in the opposition’s campaign strategy.
The Congress barely got 16 seats of the 101 it contested, a dismal strike rate of around 16%. It reached such a stage that it could not even appoint the Leader of the Opposition. Why did this happen? What went wrong?
Possibly, the campaign narrative, internal discord and a certain degree of complacency after the good performance in the Lok Sabha polls.
The campaign narrative that emerged in the rallies of Rahul Gandhi and other leaders seemed to focus entirely around the ideas he had used in the Lok Sabha and other state elections. It included removing the 50% cap on the reservation, conducting a caste census, the rhetoric on saving the Constitution, and anti-Adani rhetoric. He repeatedly mentioned the Dharavi Redevelopment Project as an attempt by the Adani group to grab people’s wealth.
The Congress’ persistent campaigning on false topics rather than issue-based debates probably did more harm to the party than anything else. Also, the MVA was plagued by internal discord. From the outset, seat-sharing negotiations were marred by conflict. Rebels contested nearly three dozen constituencies, further weakening the coalition’s prospects.
Then there was a sense of misplaced complacency. After winning 31 out of 48 seats, the MVA appeared to spend more time in seat-sharing discussions rather than on the field connecting with the voters. The Congress strategists should have focussed on its consistently reducing voter share since 2009 in the state assembly.
The MVA struggled to articulate a vision for Maharashtra. Leaders seemed bound together only by circumstance, not conviction, leaving voters disillusioned. The alliance relied on its Lok Sabha election success and failed to adapt to the distinct dynamics of an assembly election, resulting in a crushing loss.
Themes like “Save the Constitution” and the push for a caste census, which worked moderately well in the Lok Sabha elections, fell flat in the assembly context. Voters in Maharashtra were more concerned about local challenges—agrarian distress, unemployment, and the ongoing Maratha reservation movement.
Yet, the Congress and its allies largely ignored these pressing concerns, allowing the Mahayuti to dominate the conversation of development, growth and public issues. When the Congress-led MVA created societal fractures by pushing through the idea of a caste census, the BJP-led Mahayuti countered it with the ‘Ek Rahenge toh Safe Rahenge’ campaign to consolidate the votes of all castes and communities, which bore fruits for the incumbents.
Mahayuti’s focus on women oriented welfare programs, particularly the Ladki Bahin Yojana, offered immediate financial relief to distressed women and farmers, specially from the onion and cotton belt of Vidarbha and Marathwada, strengthening the BJP’s appeal.
In contrast, the Congress failed to counter this with a proactive vision, apart from mentioning a similar scheme in its manifesto. Its campaign lacked energy, cohesion, and a tangible alternative to the incumbent government’s policies.
The rallies conducted by the Congress national leadership, limited in number and repetitive in content, only reinforced the perception of a party out of touch with ground reality. The party leadership seemed distanced and even isolated from his allies, especially the Sharad Pawar faction. Just two days before the election on November 20 Sharad Pawar came out openly in defence of Adani which further isolated the Congress.
The absence of impactful promises from the opposition meant that Mahayuti’s welfare schemes took centre stage, overshadowing the opposition’s lacklustre narrative. The Congress’s dismal performance in Maharashtra and by-elections is a wake-up call for its leadership. While national narratives have their place, assembly elections demand a focus on immediate, ground-level issues. If Congress hopes to regain its relevance, it must move beyond rhetorical campaigns and focus on delivering a clear, tangible vision for development. The country, whether at the Centre, or at the State level, needs a strong opposition. But for this the message delivered by Maharashtra’s electorate must be heeded, namely that growth and welfare take precedence over false claims and disjointed alliances.
(Views expressed by the authors are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisation)
